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1 INTRODUCTION 
Comparative legal studies1 is the art of comparing legal systems with a view to, 
among other things, investigating the historical and philosophical issues relating to 
law and establishing a better regime in international relations. 2 Methodology, 
which is the noun from which 'methodological' is derived, has been defined by the 
American Heritage Dictionary (4th edition) as the, 'set or system of methods, prin-
ciples, and rules for regulating a given discipline'. 3 
From these definitions, it can be gleaned that the methodological approach to 
comparative legal studies entails the whole apparatus and procedure that is 
employed in the analysis, differentiation and assessment of legal systems. Discus-
sions about the methodology of comparative law are fundamental to the study of 
law in general, since the process of comparison takes place in all facets of life and 
influences every form of human decision making.4 
For purposes of this chapter, the methodological approach to comparative legal 
studies will be viewed as the theoretical tools, models and processes that are 
employed in the study of, and inquiry into, different legal systems. In the context of 
Africa, it means how this is undertaken by the African countries in the study of their 
legal systems and comparing them with other legal systems. Although no two legal 
systems are exactly the same, and it is a difficult task to find a common methodol-
ogy of comparative legal studies, 5 there is much convergence in the approaches 
taken by African countries in the study of their laws, and these approaches may not 
be different from those of the other jurisdictions, such as America, Europe and Asia. 
Thus, while it is impractical to consider Africa (having many groupings) as one 
entity and compare it to a country that has some uniform system of law,6 for 
instance, the United States, it does not necessarily imply that African countries and 
the United States do not have comparable methodological approaches to compara-
tive legal studies. 
1 Although 'comparative legal studies' may be broader in scope than 'comparative law', for 
purposes of this chapter and to avoid distortions, both terms are used interchangeably, 
except where it is otherwise expressly stated. A discussion on the distinction between the 
two falls outside the scope of this chapter. 
2 See F Morosini 'Giobalisation & Law: Beyond Traditional Methodology of Comparative 
Legal Studies and an Example from Private International Law' (2005) 13 Cardozo journal 
of International and Comparative Law 541, 543. The process of comparative legal studies 
ensures that the problems that are identifiable in one jurisdiction are addressed in 
identical fashion in another jurisdiction. See A Sedillo Lopez 'A Comparative Analysis of 
Women's Issues: Toward a Contextualized Methodology' (1999) Hastings Women's Law 
journa1347, 347-348. 
3 Quoted in CN Okeke 'African Law in Comparative Law: Does Comparativism Have 
Worth?' (2011) 16 Roger Williams University Law Review 1, 20. 
4 See W Palmer 'From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodol-
ogy' (2005) 53 American journal of Comparative Law 261, 261-262. 
5 See K Schadbach 'The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View' 
(1 998) 1 6 Boston University International Law journal331, 3 78. 
6 See Okeke 'African Law in Comparative Law' (n 3) 5. 
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As an important academic discipline, comparative legal studies has not received 
the deserved attention, not only in Africa, but also in other parts of the world.? This 
is so even in the face of globalisation, which has made countries interdependent8 
and is thought to be a great moment for comparative legal studies. 9 
Much of the comparative legal scholarship has almost excluded Africa from the 
scheme of studies, except for South Africa, which has received some attention 10• 
The vast majority of the academic programmes of African law faculties do not have 
a comparative law component. This unfortunate situation is reflected not unexpect-
edly in the judgments of the courts, which, as a rule, hardly advert to comparative 
law as a guide or tool for adjudication.11 The fate suffered by comparative legal 
studies in Africa may not be unconnected with the diverse systems of law found in 
the African countries. Since African law is made up of different legal systems, 
including the common law, the civil law system and customary law systems, it may 
be difficult for authorities saddled with the enforcement and interpretation of legal 
rules to understand the nuances of these different systems and how they interact. 12 
This poses a challenge to African comparativists, as the successful comparison of 
two systems requires at least a fair grasp of how the systems operate. Moreover, the 
few works on comparative legal studies in Africa may not be seeing the light of day 
due to the non-representation of Africa in the processes of law creation.13 If African 
legal systems comprise Africa's methodological approach to comparing legal stud-
ies, then the denial of the existence of African law as has been done in some 
quarters, 14 impacts comparative legal studies in Africa. 
For instance, Reimann described the teaching of comparative law in the United States as 
being in a sorry state. See M Reimann 'The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous 
Subject' (1996) 11 Tulane European & Civilian Law Forum 49, 52. 
8 Eberle has noted that comparative law should assume a more important role given the 
developments that have made the world a global village. See EJ Eberle 'The Method and 
Role of Comparative Law' (2009) 8 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 451, 
451-452. 
9 See UA Mattei et al Schlesinger's Comparative Law 7 ed (2009) 6 (observing that 
' ... globalisation is to general comparative law what the fall of the Berlin wall was for 
Soviet legal studies'). 
10 See ML Dudziak 'Who Cares about Courts? Creating a Constituency for judicial Indepen-
dence in Africa' (2003) 101 Michigan Law Review 1622, 1630-1631 (book review) 
(bemoaning the neglect of Africa as a field worth studying by American academia). 
11 The writer was part of an interview conducted in the southeast geo-political zone of 
Nigeria, wherein six High Court judges disclosed that they had no knowledge of com-
parative law. 
12 For instance, it is noted that in South Africa, magistrates' courts and the High Court are 
not grounded in the way customary law applies. See TW Bennett 'Legal Pluralism and the 
Family in South Africa: Lessons from Customary Law Reform' (2011) 25 Emory Interna-
tional Law Review 1029, 1036. This may not be peculiar to South Africa. 
13 Lowe has passionately argued that Africa is marginalised in several respects, among which 
are in the areas of international law study and the development of doctrine. See V Lowe 
'The Marginalization of Africa' (2000) 94 Proceedings of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law 231, 231-232. 
14 See W Menski Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa 
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2 OBJECTIVES AND IMPORTANCE OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 
A chapter of this nature cannot capture all the objectives and importance of 
comparative legal studies. 'The range and eclecticism of its methods are matched 
by the wide variety of its aims and uses.'15 Central to the objectives of comparative 
legal are the following: 
(1) better understanding of law; 
(2) law reform; 16 
(3) international unification and harmonisationY 
These objectives are interconnected because it is when the operation of a particular 
law or legal system is understood that it can serve as a model to reform another legal 
system or be considered as constituting a part of a unified system of law. Even 
though the term 'comparative legal studies' is relatively new, a system for compar-
ing legal rules has existed for many centuries. 18 In fact, the thought processes of 
humankind have always involved some form of comparison. For, as some sages 
have aptly observed, 'thinking without comparison is unthinkable ... '19 
Understanding law or a legal system consists in laying bare the whole apparatus 
upon which that law or legal system thrives. Sometimes a knowledge of other 
disciplines may be quite helpful in this enterprise.20 It also involves the tracking of 
both foreign and municipal changes in the law. 21 In the application of foreign law to 
domestic law: 'the comparative method is not just a requirement, but a necessity' in 
the resolution of conflict of laws.22 Globalisation has thrust a challenge on compar-
ativists who are required to keep abreast of foreign laws in order to be able to advise 
their clients on the legal requirements of transnational transactions.23 
In the African context, an understanding of the various legal systems would help 
the people confront the different problems bedevilling them and enable the gov-
ernment to make better policy choices. 24 In understanding both one's own law and 
a foreign law, a comparativist acquires a broader perspective about the interaction 
2 ed (2006) 380-492 (discussing the denial of the existence of African law (cited in SW 
Kang'ara 'Why Take Private Law Seriously in Africa?' (2011) 26 American University 
International Law Review 1125, 1127 fn 5). 
15 See MA Glendon et al Comparative Legal Traditions 3 ed (2007) 13. 
16 See Okeke (n 3) 5. 
17 See H E Chodosh 'Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology' (1999) 84 Iowa 
Law Review 1025, 1068. 
18 See Mattei et al (n 9) 10 (arguing that comparative law is not entirely a creation of the 
Paris Congress). 
19 See Palmer 'From Lerotholi to Lando' (n 4) 261 (quoting GE Swanson 'Frameworks for 
Comparative Research: Structural Anthropology and the Theory of Action' in I Vallier (ed) 
Comparative Methods in Sociology(1971) 141-202. 
20 See Eberle 'The Method and Role of Comparative Law' (n 8) 471. 
21 Chodosh 'Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology' (n 17) 1069. 
22 SeeP De Cruz Comparative Law in a Changing World 2 ed (1999) 22. 
23 De Cruz (n 22) 22. 
24 See Okeke (n 3) 9. 
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of different legal systems and is better able to deal with complex legal issues and 
problems.25 
Legal reform as an objective of comparative legal studies brings to the fore the 
way a legal system is impacted upon by another. Borrowing is a veritable tool for 
legal reform and cuts across virtually all legal systems.26 The comparison of laws is a 
necessary tool for legal borrowing. In the process of borrowing, the pertinent issues 
that arise are (i) what factors should inform the decision to reform or improve upon 
a particular law or legal regime, and (ii) who should make that decision. For 
instance, can a reform be imposed upon a people simply because it would serve the 
interests of the agent of reform? 
During the colonisation of African countries by the Western countries, customary 
law, which had to a large extent regulated the activities of the indigenous people, 
was almost made subordinate to the foreign law that was imposed on the people by 
the colonialists. In Nigeria, for instance, the repugnancy doctrine or test that 
became the standard for evaluating African customs27 was easily applied to strike 
down any aspect of the customary law that did not meet the Western standard of 
'natural justice, equity and good conscience'.28 In such a case, would the repug-
nancy doctrine have been considered reformative? 
The repugnancy doctrine also held sway in other African colonial states.29 It is 
25 See Schad bach 'The Benefits of Comparative Law' (n 5) 344. 
26 See De Cruz (n 22) 20. Writing on the cases of legal borrowing, Grossfeld notes that 
' ... the earliest legislation on companies was the French Commercial Code of 1807 which 
enacted the charter system, and formed the basis of the Prussian company law of 1843. 
The notion of income tax, which originated in England, was imitated by German legisla-
tors. The doctrine of proper allowances for dealings between connected enterprises, 
which has also been adopted in Germany, derives from the Internal Revenue Code of the 
United States ... A number of ideas in the German Civil Code are derived from the Swiss 
Law of Obligations of 1881, and German civil procedure drew heavily from Austrian law. 
The anti-trust laws of Austria have also inspired German cartel law'. De Cruz (n 22) (citing 
B Grossfeld The Strength and Weakness Of Comparative Law (1990)). 
27 See U Ewelukwa 'Posthumous Children, Hegemonic Human Rights, and the Dilemma of 
Reform Conversations Across Cultures' (2008) 19 Hastings Women's Law journal211, 
221. 
28 See s 13(1) of the Mid-Western State High Court Law No 9 of 1964, which states that 
'[t]he High Court shall observe and enforce the observance of every customary law which 
is applicable and is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor 
incompatible either directly or by implication with any written law for the time being in 
force, and nothing in this law shall deprive any person of the benefit of any such 
customary law'. Although the repugnancy doctrine was the doctrine applied in cases 
such as Edet v Essien (1982) 2 NLR; Mojekwu v Mojekwu [1997] 7 NWLR 283. 
29 Sees 19 Supreme Court Ordinance of Ghana 1876; s 76 Sierra Leone Local Courts Act 
1965; s 3 ord 3 Gambia 1955 (rev) (cited in Ewelukwa (n 27) 221 fn 80).1t is instructive to 
note that after attaining independence, Ghana, in 1960, enacted a constitution that 
removed the repugnancy clause. However, s 54 rule 6 of the Courts Act 1993 of Ghana 
mandates courts to give decisions that meet the requirements of justice, equity and good 
conscience. It is doubtful if there can be said to be a difference between the old 
repugnancy test and the task of the courts under this provision. See ES Nwauche 'The 
Constitutional Challenge of the Integration and Interaction of Customary and the 
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that in order to fit into the comparative law goal of legal reform, any 
reform that is initiated in the legal systems of African countries must be based on 
sound and well-thought-out policies and must be a product of comparative 
and not merely emanate from the parochial considerations of the leaders. 
during the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo as civilian President, 
sought to amend the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria by attempting to 
introduce a provision allowing for a third term for the Office of the President of 
Nigeria. This was to enable him to remain in office after his constitutional second 
term had expired. As can be seen from the foregoing, the motive for such amend-
ment was purely selfish and not compatible with the spirit that informed the 
processes that culminated in the drafting and adoption of the anti-corruption law in 
Nigeria, 30 or the adoption of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, which prohib-
ited all forms of discrimination and brought the apartheid system to an end. 31 
Fombad notes that in many (African) countries, one of the problems had been the 
way' African leaders had rendered constitutions dysfunctional by regularly ignoring 
their provisions or arbitrarily amending them when it suited their convenience'. 32 
Reform involves comparison and sometimes there could be disagreements 
among reformists as to what is to be compared and what aspects of a legal system 
should be borrowed and transplanted to another legal system. 33 lt is important that 
these disagreements be resolved. After all, it is the purpose of comparative legal 
studies 'to decide which solution of a problem is the best, to decide which of the 
possible solutions is most suitable and just'. 34 
Comparative legal studies is essential to the international harmonisation and 
unification of law. 35 Unification and harmonisation of law brings uniformity and 
certainty to legal systems. Although the origin of legal unification dates back to 
ancient history, 36 it was not until the nineteenth century- when national interest 
in comparative legal studies was given a boost - that unification occurred on a 
Received English Common Law in Nigeria and Ghana' (201 0) 25 Tulane European & Civil 
Law Forum 37, 46. 
3° For a detailed study on the anti-corruption legislation in Nigeria, see, generally, ON Ogbu 
'Combating Corruption in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal of the Laws, Institutions, and the 
Political Will' (2008) 14 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law99. 
31 See CM Fombad 'Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa: Reflections on 
Some Current Challenges and Future Prospects' (2011) 59 Buffalo Law Review 1007, 
1009. Referring to the legal transformation in South Africa in recent years, Bennett has 
observed that:' ... the lawgivers, whether courts or Parliament, were determined to give 
maximum effect to fundamental human rights, and, in this regard, they were heavily 
influenced by international law, together with constitutional jurisprudence from the 
more mature democracies (notably, Canada, Germany, and the United States)'. See 
Bennett 'Legal Pluralism and the Family in South Africa' (n 12) Lessons 1 055. 
32 Fombad 'Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa' (n 31) 1009. 
33 See Chodosh (n 17) 1076, 1077. 
34 See P Legrand 'Paradoxically, Derrida: For a Comparative Legal Studies' (2005) 27 
Cardozo Law Review631, 637. 
35 See Reimann 'The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject' (n 7) 56. 
36 See De Cruz (n 22) 23. 
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large scaleY This period produced the Hague Conventions on the Uniform Laws on 
International Sale of Goods38 and the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL).39 In a period when African countries are challenged by the 
same problems, such as human rights violations, poverty and corrupt leadership,40 
there is an urgent need for them to form a common front to tackle these problems 
and this is achievable through unification. In this regard, the European Union may 
provide a useful guide to Africa. However, the European unification is not without 
its problems, and thus cannot be considered a total success, especially considering 
the squabbles existing in the European Community.41 The European Union reflects 
the conflict of laws and perhaps the giving up of some laws, inherent in legal 
unification.42 On the whole, the European Community has brought some legal 
uniformity to the European soil, which is worth emulating. 
Already, there are attempts at legal unification in some regions of Africa. For 
example, the Organization Pour L'harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique 
(OHADA) is geared towards harmonisation of trade laws among the member 
countries. 43 The East African Community (EAC) has similar objectives. 44 
Despite the appeal of unification, it appears that the unification argument sees 
legal pluralism as a phenomenon that must be checked. The extent to which 
comparative legal studies can be used to achieve international unification of laws is 
limited since, in reality, a watertight legal union is not possible.45 Moreover, 
unification as a goal of comparative legal studies has to grapple with the challenges 
of conflict of laws. This conflict may be more pronounced when there are many 
jurisdictions involved as there will not only be conflict between customary law and 
statutory law but also between two (or more) legal systems.46 In the determination 
of which law or combination of laws should be adopted as governing a group of 
states, say African states, there may be a neglect of the laws of a particular state, or 
more priority may be accorded to a particular legal system, a situation that may lead 
37 De Cruz (n 22) 23. 
38 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 834 UNTS 107 
(1972); and Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods 834 UNTS 169 (1972). 
39 See De Cruz (n 22) 23. 
40 See M Ndulo 'The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment in Africa' (2003) 
10 Indiana journal of Global Legal Studies 315 (stating that' Africa's problems are myriad 
and complex'). 
41 Ndulo (n 40) 315. 
42 For instance, it has been observed that there is a 'decline of the doctrine of consideration 
in contract ... ',and that there is 'recent legislation that abolished the privity principle in 
order to bring English law in line with other jurisdictions of the European Union'. See W 
Palmer 'Mixed Legal Systems ... and the Myth of Pure Laws' (2007) 67 Louisiana Law 
Review 1205, 1209-1210 (citing H MacQueen 'Looking Forward to a Mixed Future: A 
Response to Professor Yiannopoulos' (2003) 78 Tulane Law Review 411, 412). 
43 See Okeke (n 3) 14. 
44 Okeke (n 3) 14. 
45 See Men ski Comparative Law in a Global Context (n 14) 29. 
46 Chodosh provides a hypothetical case on how this conflict can occur. See Chodosh (n 1 7) 
1078-1079 
40 
Studies in Africa 
to the imposition of laws on statesY African states are not insulated from this 
challenge. Unification requires a good balancing of the interests of the states that 
seek harmonisation of their laws. 
Hiram E Chodosh has further identified as an implicit purpose of comparative law, 
the preservation or increase of its status as an autonomous discipline.48 However, 
this is controversial as it is not settled as to whether or not comparative law 
is an autonomous subject.49 
3 AFRICA'S MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS AND COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDIES: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
A mixed legal system is considered as 'one in which two or more legal traditions, or 
parts thereof, are operating simultaneously within a single system'. 50 It is not clearly 
settled what actually constitutes a mixed legal system.51 The legal systems of the 
world are made up of disparate sources of law52 but for a system to be properly 
termed 'mixed', there must be a 'specificity of the mixture', and the 'mixture of 
common law and civil law' must be in such proportions that are capable of leaving a 
neutral observer with the impression that the mixture is obvious.53 According to 
Evans-jones, a mixed legal system is 'a legal system which, to an extensive degree, 
exhibits characteristics of both the civilian and the English common law tradi-
tions'.54 There is an argument that a country or system would still qualify as a mixed 
system where its legal system consists of written law and customary law or religious 
law and secular law. 55 It is tempting to submit that the above position is to be met 
with some objection as it seeks to equate mixed legal systems to legal pluralism. 
It is doubtful if these two concepts are coterminous. However, there is evidence 
that supports the argument by contending that mixed jurisdictions can arise when 
'constituent legal traditions have become blended (like "a puree"), either because 
of legal-cultural affinity ... or because a dominant colonial power or national elite 
eliminated local custom and replaced it with a compound legal system taken from 
another legal tradition ... '. 56 Despite the disagreement on the meaning of a mixed 
47 Chodosh (n 17) 1 078~ 1079. 
48 Chodosh (n 17) 1083. 
49 Chodosh (n 1 7) 1083. 
50 See Palmer 'Mixed Legal Systems' (n 42) 1206~ 1207. 
51 See K Kim 'Mixed Systems in Legal Origins Analysis' (201 0) 83 Southern California Law 
Review693, 704. 
52 See 0 Visser 'Cultural Forces in the Making of Mixed Legal Systems' (2003) 78 Tulane Law 
Review 41, 46. 
53 Visser 'Cultural Forces in the Making of Mixed Legal Systems' (n 52) 47 (citing W Palmer 
'Introduction to the Mixed Jurisdictions' in W Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions Worldwide 
(2001 ). 
54 See A Levasseur & JM McCreary 'Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal Family' 
(2002) 63 Louisiana Law Review 69 (book review) (quoting R Evans-Jones (ed) The Civil 
Law Tradition in Scotland (1995)). 
55 Levasseur & McCreary 'Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide' (n 54) 70. 
56 See Glendon Comparative Legal Traditions (n 15) 952. 
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legal system, it is widely accepted that elements of the common law and the civil 
law must be present in orderfor a legal system to be identified as 'mixed' .57 
South Africa is often cited as an example of a mixed legal system, 58 and while it 
stands out in Africa's mixed jurisdictions, other countries such as Togo, Burundi, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and Zimbabwe have also been 
identified as mixed systems. 59 However, Cameroon has been considered more as a 
regional hybrid system than a mixed legal system. This is due to the fact that 
although the country has two major systems (namely civil law and common law), 
the two systems are distinct and apply to separate groups of people.60 Like other 
mixed legal systems, the African jurisdictions that are mixed are prone to and in fact 
do suffer political and cultural tensions arising from the colonial imposition of law.61 
These mixed legal systems are products of successive colonial administrations that 
leave in their wake a 'mixed grill' form of law.62 
The indigenous law of the people changes from its pure state to an impure state 
as it becomes 'contaminated' with colonial, foreign law.63 Due to the operation of 
two or more systems, which sometimes have diametrical components, it becomes 
difficult to adopt a rule that would command a general acceptance. There could 
also be the problem of multiplicity of languages, such as exists in South Africa, 
which has eleven constitutionally recognised languages.64 This is where harmonisa-
tion remains useful as a comparative law objective. 
4 THE IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES IN 
AFRICA 
Colonialism constitutes an important issue when discussing comparative legal 
studies in Africa. A prominent feature of pre-colonial African legal systems was the 
predominance of customary law regulating the indigenous people. Customary law 
went through unpleasant treatment from a combination of legal positivist bias and 
the colonial mentality that did not consider it proper law.65 This was not surprising 
57 See Kim 'Mixed Systems in Legal Origins Analysis' (n 51) 702 (stating that 'most writers 
identify two main secular legal traditions: common law and civil law, and several sub 
traditions- French, German, Socialist, and Scandinavian within civil law'). 
58 See Visser (n 52) 50; Levasseur & McCreary (n 54) 70. 
59 See Kim (n 51) 701, 705. 
6° Kim (n 51) 706. 
61 See Glendon (n 15) 970. Visser writes that: ' ... the fabric of the South African legal 
system is woven out of two cross-cutting strands: the interface between European and 
indigenous law, and the interaction between principles rooted in different European 
traditions'. See F duBois & D Visser 'The Influence of Foreign Law in South Africa' (2003) 
1 3 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 593, 595. 
62 Visser writes that: ' ... the fabric of the South African legal system is woven out of two 
cross-cutting strands: the interface between European and indigenous law, and the 
interaction between principles rooted in different European traditions'. See F du Bois & D 
Visser 'The Influence of Foreign Law in South Africa' (2003) 13 Transnational Law & 
Contemporary Problems 593, 595. 
63 See DuBois & Visser (n 61 ). 
64 Glendon (n 15) 972. 
65 See Menski (n 14) 380. 
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as the Europeans had declared Africans as well as their laws as uncivilized upon the 
arrival the colonialists.66 This affected Africa's participation in the comparative 
discipline. To compound issues, the various African entities had varying customs, 
making a possible comparative enterprise remote. Good comparative law exercises 
then have meant a study of the entire gamut of the African setting. The 
repugnancy test employed by the colonialists would perhaps tend to be the only 
incidence of some form of comparative work done on Africa's indigenous laws by 
the Europeans with the purpose of diminishing those laws, but it has been earlier 
queried in this chapter, whether the repugnancy test/doctrine constitutes reform 
for purposes of comparative legal studies. 
However, fortunately the desecration of Africa's customary law did not continue 
forever, and with the winning of independence by the African intelligentsia, Africa is 
not left out in comparative legal studies. Worthy African comparativists have 
continued to make Africa relevant in the comparative discipline and are advancing 
legal reforms in Africa.67 But even after independence by the various African 
countries, the harm done to Africa's laws and their study does not seem to have 
been reversed, as it has been observed: 
Such negative assumptions still underpin assumptions that post-colonial Africans 
really have no proper religious, cultural and legal traditions to fall back on and the 
only viable method is to modernize Africa and Africans along Western lines. While 
this eventually became 'politically incorrect' during the post-colonial era, a lot of 
damage had already been done, and some developments have become irrevers-
ible. The prevailing negative assumptions about African laws are strongly reflected 
in legal scholarship and old negative views have significantly influenced the study 
of African legal systems.6s 
5 METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 
In order for the methodologies to be properly ascertained and discussed, one has to 
have the skill 69 and competence to consider and evaluate law clearly. Such consid-
eration or examination should not be from a narrow perspective, but from a very 
broad approach considering the multifarious make-up of law as a science of study. 
To carry out this function properly and satisfactorily requires objectivity and neutral-
ity. Next is the need to examine the law exactly as it is rendered, whether written or 
66 Menski (n 14) 385. 
67 For example, james Thuo Gathi; Makau wa Mutua, judge Elias (now late). See Okeke (n 3) 
6. 
68 Menski (n 14) 387. 
69 It is not intended in this study to carry out any detailed discussion of the relevant skills that 
a comparativist ought to have to be able do his or her job satisfactorily. What is most 
essential in our view is the necessity to develop critical reasoning abilities that should be 
applied in a very scientific and neutral manner. For more readings on this subject, see, for 
example, M Dogan & D Pelassy How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics 
(1984) 3-37. Besides, a comparativist should be open to the study of the history, 
traditions (whether religious or cultural), language, and so on, so as to be able to gather 
correct information about a foreign legal system directly and through an interpreter. 
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unwritten (for example, customary law). Then, it will be necessary, as a third step, 
to examine how the law functions and is used within a given society. 
5.1 Historical method 
In order to properly understand comparative legal studies, knowledge of the law 
itself is required. Since the realm of comparative legal studies centres on compari-
son of laws or legal systems, it is logical that a survey of the history of the different 
laws to be compared should be carried out. This encompasses the tenet of the 
historical method or approach to comparative legal studies, for it has been 
observed that 'comparative law without the history of law is an impossible task'J0 
Such history is important because it explains why a particular legal system works for 
the country or groups of countries that adopt it. For example, the peculiar history of 
the English parliamentary system is responsible for why the monarchy has contin-
ued to thrive in England. Nigeria, a former British colony, practised the parliamen-
tary system of government imposed on it by the colonisers. However, Nigeria 
discarded the parliamentary system of government in 1963 when it became a 
republic, adopting in its place a presidential, federal system of government more 
suited to its new status as a republic and its cultural and social history. 
Customary law has continued to form an important source of law in African 
countries, despite the attempts of the colonisers to discredit it.71 This is not unre-
lated to the historical background of the African communities. African customary 
laws have normative foundations that are rooted in societal history. 72 The historical 
approach becomes of practical importance when a country seeks to borrow some 
legal aspects of another legal system, since what works for, say, Germany, may not 
work for Ghana because of the two countries' different histories. The historical 
approach is employed either to rediscover forgotten but still helpful ideas, or to 
investigate how a legal measure has affected behaviour. It is also useful in under-
standing and solving problems through the study of past and foreign concepts. 73 
5.2 Functional method or approach 
Today, we understand that when we compare rules, we must take a functional 
approach; that is, we must analyse not only what rules say but also what problems 
they solve in their respective legal systems.74 
The functional approach to comparative legal studies is result-oriented, and 
serves a wide range of social purposes, and is not limited to solving the problems of 
70 See Glendon (n 15) 6. 
71 jessup seems to have put up an argument that though the Europeans to a very large 
extent ignored Africa's indigenous laws due in part to their unwritten nature, those laws 
nevertheless regulated the conduct of the people who showed compliance to the law. 
The factual and psychological elements of which those laws are composed make them 
capable of ensuring continuity and qualify them as legal order. See G jessup 'Symbiotic 
Relations: Clinical Methodology- Fostering New Paradigms in African Legal Education' 
(2002) 8 Clinical Law Review 377, 381-382. 
72 See Menski (n 14) 420. 
73 See Schadbach (n 5) 367 (1998). 
74 Glendon (n 15) 11. 
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a geographical entity.75 The functional approach is identified as the 
dominant methodology of comparative legal studies.76 Any comparative law ques-
tion must be couched in comparative terms.7 7 Functionalism thrives on the 
assumption that though there are different societies, they seem to have similar 
problems that can be solved through different means, though quite often with 
similar results for the benefit of all.78 
Following this postulation, there may be attainment of a unity of legal systems of 
the world, when the common problems of the different states are resolved. Gar-
barino has shown how the functional approach can serve as a panacea to the tax 
problems of different countries.79 The assumption that states face the same prob-
lems may have some objection attending it, for there may be some legal problems 
that are peculiar to a legal system or a group of legal systems. However, this 
objection does not affect the fact that the solution to such problems can still be 
found in another legal system, since 'only a fool would refuse quinine just because it 
didn't grow in his back garden'. 80 The functional method has a practical orientation 
and focuses on what legal rules can actually do, rather than what they say. 81 
Another assumption of the functional school is that the resolution of practical 
problems by legal systems occurs the same way.82 The pragmatic undertone of 
functionalism seems to stand out as a methodology of comparative legal studies. 
However, a lot of criticisms have been directed toward the functional approach.83 
5.3 Legal harmonisation and unification 
Not only are harmonisation and unification an objective of comparative legal 
studies, they also seem to constitute its methodology. There are now attempts at 
adopting a uniform system of law or set of rules regulating people in a given region. 
Harmonisation and unification are mainly achieved by negotiating treaties, both 
75 See R Teitel 'Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age' (2004) 117 Harvard Law 
Review 2570, 2574 (book review). 
76 See T Ruskola 'Legal Oriental ism' (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1 79, 188. It has been 
described as the backbone of serious comparative research. See C Garbarino 'An Evolu-
tionary Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research' (2009) 
57 American journal of Comparative Law677, 681. 
77 See Legrand 'Paradoxically, Derrida: For a Comparative Legal Studies' (n 34) 638. 
78 SeeK Zweigert & H Ki:itz An Introduction to Comparative Law 3 ed (1998) 34 (cited in OY 
Marian 'The Discursive Failure of Tax Law' (201 0) 58 American journal of Comparative Law 
415, 428; CJ Roederer 'Working the Common Law Pure: Developing the Law of Delict 
(Torts) in Light of the Spirit, Purport and Objects of South Africa's Bills of Rights' (2009) 26 
Arizona journal of International & Comparative Law 427, 442. 
79 See, generally, Garbarino 'An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation' (n 76). 
80 See Teitei'Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age' (n 75) 2575. 
81 See 0 Brand 'Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Compara-
tive Legal Studies' (2007) 32 Brooklyn journal of International Law405, 409. 
82 Brand 'Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative 
Legal Studies' (n 81) 410. 
83 See, generally, Brand (n 81) 412-421. 
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bilateral and multilateral, with a view to reducing differences in the same legal 
fields, and producing identical laws in specific areas among the agreed countries. 84 
5.4 Method of reviewing customary/natural law 
Although customary law is recognised in the entities that make up Africa and in fact 
constitutes a bulk of their laws, the issues relating to customs in Africa are yet to be 
settled. Africa is made up of not less than fifty-four countries.85 This may imply that 
there is about a similar number of customs across the African continent. Customary 
law, by its nature, is largely unwritten, and varies according to locality.86 Moreover, 
it is susceptible to change. 87 While in some countries customary law is treated as a 
question of fact that has to be proved by evidence,88 in others, it is considered a 
question of law.89 This divergent treatment of customary law and other issues of 
customary law have a great implication for comparative legal studies in Africa, 
especially in the context of harmonisation and unification. Meaningful harmonisa-
tion of customary law in Africa may entail that various customary rules on the 
African continent be treated the same way: as a question of law. This call had been 
made by a distinguished African scholar, TO Elias, who has advocated that all 
independent Commonwealth African countries tread the Ghanaian path and 
regard customary law as a question of law.90 However, this idea has been criticised 
for its tendency to push nationalism and patriotism to the extreme.91 This cannot be 
achieved without a codification of the various customary law rules existing in 
African states. Not only does this appear a difficult task, if not an impossible one, it 
will affect the evolutionary nature of customary law.92 Perhaps, this is one of the 
most visible ways in which legal pluralism inhibits harmonisation. 
84 See Schadbach (n 5) 393-394 (making some distinction between harmonisation and 
unification). 
85 See Okeke (n 3) 5. 
86 See RN Nwabueze 'The Dynamics and Genius of Nigeria's Indigenous Legal Order' 
(2002) 1 Indigenous Law journal153, 156. 
87 See Barimah Balogun and Scottish Nigerian Mortgage and Trust Co Ltd v Saka Chief Oshodi 
(1931 )1 0 NLR 36 at 51, 53-54; M Gluckman (ed) Ideas and Procedures in African Custom-
ary Law (1 969) 9. 
88 In the Nigerian legal system, customary law is a question of fact, which can be proved by 
the calling of witnesses, and, in the case of a notorious custom, by judicial notice. See 
s 14(1) Evidence Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, Cap 112 Vol VII; Angu v 
Attah [1921] Privy Council Judgment (1874-1928) 43. 
89 For example, currently, Ghana treats customary law rules as questions of law. See s 55 
Ghana Courts Act, 1993; JA Davies & DN Dagbanja 'The Role and Future of Customary 
Tort Law in Ghana: A Cross-Cultural Perspective' (2009) 26 Arizona journal of International 
& Comparative Law 303, 307. 
90 See TO Elias The judicial Process in Commonwealth Africa (1977) (cited in Nwabueze 'The 
Dynamics and Genius of Nigeria's Indigenous Legal Order' (n 86) w73-74). 
91 Nwabueze (n 86) 173-174. 
92 Nwabueze (n 86) 161. 
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5.5 Economic analysis method or approach 
The economic approach, the development of which is attributed to Ugo Mattei, 
arose as a result of mounting dissatisfaction with the functional method.93 Having a 
nexus with the functional approach, it is concerned with developing a paradigm for 
a proper legal solution, and identifies such paradigm to be 'efficiency'.94 In 
order to properly analyse legal rules, an application of economic concepts is very 
and notions of justice are de-emphasised.95 An efficient legal system would be 
identified as one with ' ... lesser waste, lower transaction costs, better resource 
allocation, or greater freedom for individual to interact'. 96 The process of legal 
transplant involves competition among the legal systems, and in the end, only the 
efficient systems emerge victorious or, rather, dominant. 97 In principle, this would 
seem beneficial to the entire world, but with the asymmetry of economic power 
between developed countries, on the one side, and developing and underdevel-
oped countries, on the other side, it is evident that the latter may not fit into the 
competition. However, the economic approach may be helpful to African countries 
that are mainly developing in working out a uniform economic law that would 
govern their transactions. Building on an assumption that there is a competitive 
market for the supply of law,98 the economic approach explores legal transplant, 
and the convergence and divergence of legal systems, as a function of this competi-
tion.99 The economic approach focuses on the economic and practical efficiency of 
law and its rules. 
5.6 Law and cultural method or approach 
While the functional approach to comparative legal studies espouses the view that 
legal systems have similar problems to grapple with, the cultural method ascribes 
uniqueness to every culture. 1 00 Thus, every system possesses specific legal traditions 
and cultures. To this extent, the cultural method emphasises differences in legal 
systems. 1 01 Laws are an expression of culture, and the cultural context of law should 
be considered when engaging in comparative exercises. It is this cultural undertone 
of comparative legal studies that is reflected in the call that a comparativist must use 
a technique of 'cultural immersion', which gets comparative law enmeshed in the 
'political, historical, economic, and linguistic contexts that molded the legal sys-
tem, and in which the legal system operates'. 1 02 Since the cultural approach 
recognises differences in cultures, and perhaps attempts to preserve them, it would 
93 See Brand (n 81) 421. 
94 See Marian 'The Discursive Failure of Tax Law' (n 78) 432. 
95 See X Benavides 'Competition Among Laws' (2008) 77 Revista juridica Universidad de 
Puerto Rico 373, 376. 
96 See Brand (n 81) 421-422. 
97 Marian (n 78) 432. 
98 Marian (n 78) 432. 
99 Brand (n 81) 423. 
100 See Marian (n 78) 432. 
101 Brand (n 81) 429. 
102 See Eberle (n 8) 458 (citing VG Curran 'Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in 
US Comparative Law' (1998) 46 American journal of Comparative Law 43. 
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then follow that legal unification works against the preservation of these differ-
ences. In this regard, Legrand has observed that 'when the forces of unification 
threaten what gives a people its cultural identity, it is time we draw back and 
reconsider'. 103 The cultural method may not be reformative or normative since it is 
only employed to locate and describe cultural differences. 104 One of the problems 
associated with the cultural approach is the difficulty in ascertaining what really 
makes up legal culture. 1 05 An identification of the components of a legal culture is 
required for the cultural method to emerge as a successful enterprise. 
5.7 Critical approach 
Traditional comparative legal studies have contained a strong hegemonial-ideo-
logical flavour, and being Eurocentric, have sought to assimilate the non-Western 
world into the fold of the Western systems. 1 06 The critical approach to comparative 
legal studies is a movement to strip comparative law of its Eurocentric garment. 
Frankenberg, an apostle of the critical method, envisages the manner of its applica-
tion to be a three-step process. The first step, he maintains, is to remove the 
multifaceted factual situations from their social context and place them in a legal 
framework. The second step requires the deconstruction of the process of making 
legal decisions in order to reveal the political interests underlying this process. The 
third step sees the restoration of the cultural context to the legal framework from 
which it had earlier been removed. 1 o7 The critical approach seeks to include 
non-Western states, including African countries, as actors in comparative legal 
studies. 
5.8 Convergence approach and the non convergence approach 
The convergence approach sees legal systems as existing in different forms but 
sharing a common essence.108 Advocates of this approach believe that legal sys-
tems share common features that may not be totally equivalent. 1 09 
Arguing that the world has enough differences, Markesinis advises that compara-
tive legal studies should concentrate on the similarities that exist among different 
legal systems. 11 0 The functional approach is therefore a species of the convergence 
approach since it holds that the legal problems of all countries are similar, and that 
103 SeeP Legrand 'John Henry Merryman and Comparative Legal Studies: A Dialogue' (1999) 
47 American journal of Comparative Law 3, 46 (cited in Marian (n 78) 433). 
104 Brand(n81)429. 
105 Marian (n 78) 434. 
106 See Marian (n 78) 435. 
107 See G Frankenberg 'Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative Law' (1985) 26 Har-
vard International Law journal411, 450--452 (cited in Marian (n 78) 436). 
108 See Morosini 'Giobalisation & Law: Beyond Traditional Methodology of Comparative 
Legal Studies and an Example from Private International Law' (n 2) 545. 
109 See Chodosh (n 17) 1118 
110 Morosini (n 2) 545 (citing BS Markesinis Foreign Law & Comparative Methodology: A 
Subject & A Thesis (1997) 6). 
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every system deals with the same questions, irrespective of the differences 
existing in their social structures and stages of development. 111 
The non-convergence approach deviates from the convergence approach, and is 
concerned with the differences that exist between legal systems. To the comparat-
ivist of the non-convergence ideology, law is a living part of an overall culture; and 
to for the similarities between legal systems is superficial since that would be 
overlooking the cultural specificity in legal systems.112 The cultural approach uses 
the non-convergence model. 
6 THE USE OF COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY BY ADJUDICATORY 
BODIES IN AFRICAN STATES 
A discussion of the methodological approach to comparative legal studies in Africa 
would be incomplete without an inclusion of the ways the courts of some African 
countries apply comparative law analysis when arriving at decisions. In this regard, 
the judiciaries of three African countries, namely Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, 
will be discussed here. 
6.1 Ghana 
Ghana is a unitary state, 113 and operates the common law system, having been 
colonised by the British up till 1958, when it secured its independence.114 It is 
situated between Cote d'lvoire and Togo, and is made up of numerous ethnic 
groups and linguistic units.115 Although Ghana is a dualist country,116 the courts do 
consider international law in the adjudication of cases. International law, especially 
in the dualist context, is a system of law different from domestic law. That being the 
case, use of such international law by the courts has a comparative law dimension. 
In Ghana Lotto Operators v National Lottery Authority, 117 the court employed some 
dynamism reflective of modern practice to the interpretation of the Constitution of 
Ghana, and ruled in favour of a presumption of the justiciability of the Directive 
Principles of State Policy (Chapter 6 of the Ghanaian Constitution). 
In New Patriotic Party v Inspector General of Police, 118 the Supreme Court of Ghana 
took cognizance of the provisions of an international instrument in arriving at its 
111 See Brand (n 81) 409-410. 
112 See Morosini (n 2) 546. 
113 See art 4(1) Constitution of Ghana, 1992. 
114 Ghana is reckoned to be the first south-Saharan country to have gained independence. 
See SO Manteaw 'Entering the Digital Marketplace: E-commerce and jurisdiction in 
Ghana' (2003) 16 Transnational Law 345, 350; SO Gyandoh jr 'Tinkering With the 
Criminal justice System in Common Law Africa' (1989) 62 Temple Law Review 1131, 
1141. 
115 Ibid. 
116 The dualist theory posits that international law and municipal law are two separate and 
distinct systems that can only interact with the consent of both. See UO Umozurike 
Introduction To International Law 3 ed (2005) 30. 
117 Supreme Court of Ghana Law Reports (2007-2008) 1088. 
118 (1993-1994) 2 Ghana Law Reports 459 (SC); (2001) African Human Rights Law Reports 
138 (GhSC). 
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decision. Not only that, the court noted that the requirement of police permits 
before holding a peaceful protest in Ghana, which had its roots in colonialism, was 
no longer practised in England, and wondered why it should still be in practice in 
Ghana.119 
Apart from their references to international law provisions in adjudication, the 
Ghanaian judiciary has recourse to foreign law, and draws inspiration from the laws 
of other jurisdictions. For example, in New Patriotic Party v Inspector General of 
Police, 120 the court, speaking through Hayfron-Benjamin JSC, observed that: 
In rendering my opinion, I have considered and applied the views - both of the 
majority and the dissenting contained in the judgments of the United States 
Supreme Court which show the principles and policy considerations involved. In 
my respectful opinion, they constitute useful guides to the interpretation of our 
Constitution, 1992 - particularly the charter on fundamental human and civil 
rights. 
Similarly, in the cases of Asare v Attorney-General, 121 and Adofo v Attorney-General 
& Anor, 122 the courts placed reliance on the Australian case of Theophanous v Herald 
Weekly Time Ltd123 and the American case of Evans v Gore, 124 respectively, in 
resolving constitutional issues. This tends to show that to some extent, Ghanaian 
courts embrace the comparative law discipline. 
6.2 Nigeria 
Like Ghana, Nigeria was a British colony. Independence was secured in 1960.125 
With over 250 ethnic groups, 126 Nigeria is a multi-cultural country, and is domi-
nated by two major religions: Christianity and Islam. The relationship between 
adherents of the two religions has been far from cordial, and of recent, one of the 
greatest challenges facing Nigeria is the Boko Haram menace, which some believe 
has both religious and political dimensions.127 Although international treaties do 
not have automatic application in Nigeria by virtue of Nigeria's dualist status and 
119 Chief justice Archer had queried rhetorically: ' ... Police permits are colonial relics and 
have no place in Ghana in the last decade of the twentieth century ... Those who 
introduced police permits in this country do not require police permits in their own 
country to hold public meetings and processions. Why should we require them?' See 
J Stevens 'Colonial Relics 1: The Requirement of a Permit to Hold a Peaceful Assembly' 
(1997) 41 journal of African Law 118. 
120 (1993-1994) 2 Ghana Law Reports 459 (SC). 
121 (2003-2004) Supreme Court of Ghana Law Reports 823. 
122 (2005-2006) Supreme Court of Ghana Law Reports 42. 
123 (1994) 182 Commonwealth Law Reports 1 04. 
124 253 us 25 (1920). 
125 Ahmadu Bello, the late Sardauna of Sokoto, asserted that 'God did not create Nigeria, the 
British did'. See E Orji 'Issues on Ethnicity and Governance in Nigeria: A Universal Human 
Rights Perspective' (2001) 25 Fordham International Law journal431, 436. 
126 See Okeke (n 3) 27. 
127 See, generally, JA Dada & B Ejue 'Boko Haram and Amnesty: A Philo-Legal Appraisal' 
International journal of Humanities and Social Science (2012) Vol2 No 4 [Special Issue] 231. 
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of its constitution, 128 the courts have in a good number of cases 
treaties in deciding cases. 129 The decisions of the courts of other jurisdic-
tions have also been cited in a comparative context by Nigerian courts. In Abacha v 
Fawehinmi, 130 the Supreme Court held as applicable to Nigeria, the view expressed 
by the Privy Council in Higgs & Anor v Minister of National Security & Ors131 that 
unincorporated treaties 'might have an indirect effect upon the construction of 
statutes or might give rise to a legitimate expectation by citizens that the govern-
ment, in its act affecting them, would observe the terms of the treaty'. 132 In Lakanmi 
v Attorney General (West Nigeria), 133 the court took pains in making reference to 
cases from Uganda, Australia, Cyprus, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.134 In Agbakoba v Director State Security Services, 135 in deciding the 
main issue of the case, which was whether the right to travel abroad necessarily 
implied the right to possess a Nigerian passport, which was a sine qua non of 
international travel, the Court of Appeal explored comparative jurisprudence from 
the United States, the United Kingdom and India, and came to the conclusion that 
the freedom of exit guaranteed by the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria, then in 
operation, 'cannot be exercised without a passport and that freedom enshrined in 
Section 38(1) of the Constitution carries with it a concomitant right of every citizen 
of Nigeria to a passport'. 
It appears the use of comparative jurisprudence is not firmly established in the 
Nigerian courts, the result of which is that they still to a very great extent restrict 
themselves to the domestic legal system. This does not bode well for the advance-
ment of the Nigerian legal system; especially in this era, where globalisation has 
come to mean much for the entire world. Comparative jurisprudence would give 
the Nigerian courts a rich fountain from which to draw legal principles and rules to 
adjudicate matters. 
6.3 South Africa 
South Africa is a mixed legal system, which derives from its colonial history. The 
history of South Africa would be incomplete without the mention of the apartheid 
128 Sees 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, as amended, the provision of which is 
that no treaty can have the force of law except if it is enacted as law. 
'No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law 
except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the 
National Assembly.' 
129 See, for example, Oshevire v British Caledonian Airways Ltd (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt 163) 507; 
lbidapo v Lufthansa Airlines (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt 498) 124; Chima Ubani v Director, SSS 
(1999) 11 NWLR (Pt 625) 129; Registered Trustees of Constitutional Rights Project v the 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Unreported Civil suit M/1 02/92 Judgment of 
5 May 1992; and Ogugu v the State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt 366) 1, 26-27. 
130 (2001) African Human Rights Law Reports 1 72 (NgSC 2000). 
131 [2000]2 Weekly Law Reports 1 368. 
132 [n 1 31] at 1 375; Abacha v Fawehinmi (2001) African Human Rights Law Reports 1 72 (NgSC 
2000) at 1 72-173. 
133 (1970) 6 NSCC 143. 
134 See Okeke (n 3) 31. 
135 (1994) 6 Nigerian Weekly Law Reports (Pt 351 ). 
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policy, which consisted in the segregation of, and discrimination against, the 
non-white population in South Africa. 136 Although the policy is now over, it is 
doubtful if its scars have disappeared from the South African socio-political land-
scape. 
A remarkable aspect of the South African legal system is the constitutional 
provision that mandates courts or tribunals to consider international Taw in inter-
preting the Bill of Rights. 137 Such courts or tribunals may also consider foreign law 
and are enjoined to give interpretations that are consistent with international law. 
This provision and similar provisions in the constitutions of some other African 
countries have been applauded as a sign that 'African countries are becoming open 
to and receptive to outside normative influences'.138 However, it is not evident that 
the courts in South Africa have utilised this provision.139 It is argued that in the 
South African case of Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and others v President of 
the Republic of South Africa,140 the Constitutional Court merely dwelt on whether 
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, allowing prosecution for 'grave 
breaches', applied to South Africa, without considering the customary law rules on 
genocide, torture, and war crimes. 141 
The facts, as reported, were that: 
The applicants applied to the Constitutional Court for an order declaring section 
20(7) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act unconstitutional. 
Section 20(7) permits the committee on amnesty established by the Act to grant 
amnesty in respect to any act, omission or offence provided that the applicant 
concerned has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts, and provided further that 
the relevant act, omission or offence was associated with a political objective and 
committed prior to 6 December 1993. As a result of the granting of amnesty, the 
perpetrator is relieved from criminal or civil liability. The State or any other body, 
organisation or person that would ordinarily have been vicariously liable is also 
relieved from liability.l42 
However, it is instructive to know that the court, in upholding the constitutionality 
of section 20(n made reference to the amnesty laws and practices of other 
jurisdictions. In the words of the Constitutional Court: 
South Africa is not alone in being confronted with a historical situation which 
required amnesty for criminal acts to be accorded for the purposes of facilitating 
136 See Okeke (n 3) 33. 
137 Sees 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
138 See RF Oppong 'Re-lmagining International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the 
Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Africa' (2007) 30 Fordham 
International Law journal296, 325. 
139 See Okeke (n 3) 36, 37. 
14° CCT17 /96 (1996) ZACC 16; 1996 (8) BCLR 1 015; 1996 (4) SA 672 (25 July 1996) 
(hereinafter AZAPO case). 
141 See Okeke (n 3) 36, 37 (citing I Dugard 'International Law and the South African 
Constitution' (1997) 8 European journal of International Law 77, 90-91 ). 
142 See the AZAPO case (n 142). 
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the transition to, and consolidation of, an overtaking democratic order. Chile, 
Argentina and El Salvador are among the countries which have in modern times 
been confronted with a similar need. Although the mechanisms adopted to facili-
tate that process have differed from country to country and from time to time, the 
that amnesty should, in appropriate circumstances, be accorded to 
violators of human rights in order to facilitate the consolidation of new democra-
cies was accepted in all these countries and truth commissions were also estab-
lished in such countries. The Argentinean truth commission was created by 
Executive Decree 187 of 15 December 1983 ... The Chilean Commission on Truth 
and Reconciliation was established on 25 April1990. The Commission on the Truth 
for El Salvador was established ... in 1992 ... In many cases amnesties followed in 
all these countries.143 
It is evident from the foregoing that the Constitutional Court did more than merely 
consider the 1949 Geneva Conventions in reaching its decision. It was engaged in a 
form of comparative jurisprudence, exploring what had been obtained in other 
jurisdictions, in amnesty cases. 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Undoubtedly, comparative legal studies in Africa have a potentially great future. 
Whether this potentiality is transformed into something 'real' or meaningful 
depends on the role played by those African legal scholars engaged in the teaching 
and dissemination of comparative legal studies. Provided these scholars have the 
will to develop the discipline of comparative legal studies, the more likelihood there 
is that its future will indeed be great. There is, however, one critical problem that 
needs to be resolved in order for this to happen: African academia needs to 
overcome its reliance on, and in some instances slavish devotion to, the legal 
models and systems of the former colonial powers. Deferring to foreign perspec-
tives of studying and teaching law betrays an unfortunate colonial mentality that 
has left African scholars with an ingrained inferiority complex regarding their own 
capabilities. 
The reasons for this undesirable state of affairs are not hard to find. The leading 
academics and scholars in charge of developing the syllabi at the existing faculties 
of law at the time (that is, in the immediate post-colonial years) had themselves 
been trained according to Western notions of what constituted valid legal systems 
and norms. According to this ideology, African views on matters of law did not 
merit consideration, which consequentially meant that the African academics 
charged with developing the syllabi of the law faculties continued to downplay or 
ignore the significance of African customary or traditional law. Even the practition-
ers and policy makers were not more exposed or sophisticated. In fact, the majority 
of the leading lawyers in all cadres of the legal systems, including the judiciary, 
seemed to be myopic and parochial in their attitudes to law and legal education. 
The negative attitude against considering how legal issues are handled in other 
legal systems - through comparative legal systems ('CLS') - persisted until the 
143 AZAPO case (n 142). 
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mid-1980s, when legal scholars trained in other non-common law countries man-
aged with great difficulty to break through the formidable barrier preventing them 
from participating in the development of their national legal systems. 144 
144 This writer's career as a teacher of law began in Nigeria's premier faculty of law- The 
University of Nigeria, Faculty of Law, Enugu Campus (1974-1985). The Law Faculty at 
that time was heavily populated by individuals who had been educated at English or 
American universities and who therefore were familiar with, and aligned to, Western 
attitudes regarding law. Thereafter, between 1985 and 1995, I pioneered the establish-
ment of two new faculties of law in my capacity as Pioneer Dean and Professor of Law; a 
career development that opened up a great many opportunities. The two accredited 
teaching and learning institutions where I worked were the Anambra State University 
Faculty of Law (ASUTECH), (now the Nnamdi Azikiwe University), Awka, for the years 
1985 to1991, and the Enugu State University of Science and Technology (ESUT), Enugu, 
Nigeria, from 1991 to 1995. In establishing those two faculties, I had the singular 
opportunity to offer a variety of new law subjects and practical clinical programmes in a 
law syllabus that was more progressive than the syllabi of other, more traditional faculties 
of law in the Nigerian tertiary education system. The interdisciplinary courses of Com-
parative Legal Systems and Law in Society were prominent among the new subjects that I 
introduced. My rationale for including these courses was based on the great benefit I had 
gained from being exposed early to such vital comparative law subjects in my legal 
education in the then Soviet Socialist Republics. For a more detailed discussion of 
comparisons in legal education, see C Okeke 'Re-Assessing Soviet Union Contribution to 
the Legal Training of Third World Lawyers in the Twentieth Century: A Critical Appraisal of 
Socialist Legal Education' (published in the Ukrainian, Russian and English Languages) 
International Law No 1 I 2012. 
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